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TORTURED LANGUAGE:
LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS
AND THE 212(H) WAIVER
Julianne Lee*
Recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act have greatly
expanded the grounds for removal of lawful permanent residents (LPRs)
and, at the same time, constricted judicial review of agency decisions to
deport immigrants. Language added to the 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility
has increased the number of LPRs that are now ineligible for relief from
removal by barring certain LPRs from applying for a waiver if, since the
date of their admission, they have committed an aggravated felony or have
failed to accrue seven years of continuous presence. The controversy
discussed in this Note stems from differing interpretations of this statutory
provision.
Nine courts of appeals have ruled that an aggravated felony or lack of
continuous residence bars relief under section 212(h) only for those
noncitizens who were admitted to the country as LPRs following inspection
at a port of entry. In removal proceedings outside of those circuits, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) holds that relief is unavailable to all
LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony or who fail to meet the residence
requirements after acquiring LPR status, regardless of the manner in which
they acquired that status. The Eighth Circuit alone has followed that ruling
(leaving only the First and Twelfth Circuits without an opinion on the
issue).
This Note describes the split over section 212(h) against the backdrop of
current trends in immigration law around statutory interpretation and the
agency deference doctrine. It analyzes the current state of U.S. Supreme
Court deference to the BIA to understand how this issue might play out in
the Court and argues that the plain meaning of the statute supports the
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INTRODUCTION
Nine-year-old Shaun Roberts traveled from his native Bahamas to the
United States on a temporary visitor visa.1 He did not leave when his visa
expired and fell out of status until becoming a lawful permanent resident
(LPR) two years later.2 Over the next few decades, Roberts built a life in
1. Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928, 929 (8th Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 929. Most likely, Roberts was able to adjust status under an amnesty or
legalization provision despite overstaying his visa. See RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON
IMMIGRATION LAW § 9:22, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015).

2015]

LPRs AND THE 212(H) WAIVER

1203

the United States—a life that was interrupted in 2011 when he received a
Notice to Appear in immigration court for a removal hearing.3 Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had learned that Roberts, now almost forty
years old, had two criminal convictions in his home state of Minnesota.4
Although his most recent conviction occurred more than ten years prior to
his removal hearing, the immigration judge found that his crimes rendered
Roberts removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act5 (INA).
The immigration judge held that Roberts’s convictions rendered him
statutorily ineligible for every form of relief he sought: cancellation of
removal, adjustment of status, and a waiver of inadmissibility.6 The Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.7 Roberts appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, which affirmed the BIA’s holding that his third-degree assault
conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable and
statutorily barring him from seeking cancellation of removal.8 The court
had only to decide whether Roberts was eligible for an INA section 212(h)
waiver of inadmissibility9—his last chance to remain in the United States.10
Some foreign nationals who have been convicted of an aggravated felony
are ineligible for a 212(h) waiver.11 Roberts’s fate—and those of countless
LPRs—hinged on the interpretation of a single phrase: “No waiver shall be
granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission the alien has
been convicted of an aggravated felony.”12
The BIA has interpreted that phrase as barring 212(h) relief for all LPRs
convicted of an aggravated felony after acquiring LPR status, regardless of
how they acquired that status.13 The Eighth Circuit chose to follow the
BIA’s interpretation, finding Roberts ineligible for relief and ordering him
removed to the Bahamas, a place in which he had not set foot for over thirty
years.14
In withholding 212(h) relief from Roberts, the Eighth Circuit diverged
from every other circuit court that has grappled with the quoted statutory
3. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929. A Notice to Appear is a document that alleges facts and
specifies the statutory removal grounds ICE is charging. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY &
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1, 515 (5th ed.
2009).
4. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929.
5. Id. The immigration judge found that Roberts’s convictions constituted crimes
involving moral turpitude and included one aggravated felony. See infra Part I.B.
6. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929.
7. Id. at 929–30.
8. Id. at 931.
9. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012).
10. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 931.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2)). One court has referred to
this provision as “tortured language.” Papazoglou v. Holder, 724 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir.
2013).
13. See Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 789 (B.I.A. 2012); Matter of
Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 224 (B.I.A. 2010).
14. Roberts, 745 F.3d at 929.
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language. To date, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that the statute’s unambiguous
language bars only those LPRs who entered the country already holding
LPR status from eligibility for a 212(h) waiver.15 In those circuits, the
aggravated felony bar does not apply to foreign nationals who entered the
country with a different status or without any status at all and later attained
LPR status post-admission. Under this interpretation, Roberts would have
been eligible for the 212(h) waiver, having entered the United States under
temporary visitor status, and later adjusted to LPR status. Put differently,
had he lived in a different state, his appeal’s outcome might have been
different.
This Note considers the lopsided circuit split over whether all LPRs are
barred from seeking a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility regardless of
whether they, like Roberts, adjusted to LPR status after their initial entry or
whether they entered the country holding that status. The split raises
questions of traditional statutory interpretation and judicial deference to the
immigration agency. There are two strong reasons the U.S. Supreme Court
should step in to settle the meaning of section 212(h). First, in the removal
context, issues of statutory interpretation have profound and direct
consequences on individual lives.16 Second, the Court has said that federal
laws should be uniformly enforced where possible.17 Given the split—with
a lone circuit siding with the agency and nine circuits against it—the
question is ripe for a Supreme Court ruling.
Part I describes the 212(h) waiver within the context of removal and
relief. It provides background information on immigration’s statutory
scheme, as well as describes the dwindling avenues for relief and narrowing
of judicial review of BIA decisions. Part II presents the circuit split and the
BIA decision relating to LPRs’ eligibility for 212(h) waivers. It also
describes different theories on where the Court is headed in terms of its
deference (or lack thereof) to the BIA based on immigration decisions from
the 2009 to 2013 Terms. Part III argues that the majority of the courts of

15. See Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015); Husic v. Holder, 776
F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014); Negrete-Ramirez
v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014); Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir.
2013); Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380
(4th Cir. 2012); Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631
F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008).
16. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)) (noting that deportation can equate to “banishment or
exile” and that stakes in removal hearings are high); Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922) (noting that removal leads to “loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life
worth living”); Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In immigration matters,
so much is at stake—the right to remain in this country, to reunite a family, or to work.”);
see also Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 463–64 (2009) (noting the particular
vulnerability of immigrants subject to removal proceedings).
17. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2000 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress’s goal of uniform enforcement of
immigration laws).

2015]

LPRs AND THE 212(H) WAIVER

1205

appeals are correct in their interpretation of section 212(h). That part
resolves the larger statutory interpretation and policy issues implicated by
an analysis of section 212(h). It argues that, given the complexity of the
immigration scheme, strict interpretations of the INA should trump agency
deference arguments. This Note concludes by arguing that the Supreme
Court should rule against the BIA and the Eighth Circuit if it considers the
section 212(h) issue.
I. THE IMMIGRATION SCHEME AND SECTION 212(H):
A HIDEOUS CREATURE
Part I provides background information on the structure of the INA to
show how section 212(h) fits within the larger immigration context. This
part describes important modern immigration trends, including diminishing
opportunities for relief from deportation and narrowing of judicial review,
against the historical backdrop of judicial deference in the immigration
arena.
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization.”18 The Court has long held that Congress has broad
power to decide whom to admit and exclude from the United States—that
power being an integral and inherent part of national sovereignty.19 Under
this longstanding plenary power doctrine, Congress exercises nearly
unreviewable power to regulate immigration.20
While the first attempt to restrict immigration dates back to the Alien Act
of 1798, Congress passed the bulk of immigration legislation in the
twentieth century.21 In 1952, Congress overhauled the existing immigration
scheme and enacted the INA, which, together with decades of amendments,
provides the current statutory framework for modern immigration law.22
The INA sets forth intricate rules for who may enter the country and what
they must do to stay; its notoriously complex nature has led one
commentator to call it a “hideous creature.”23

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713–14, 762 (1893) (holding that
the right of a nation to exclude or expel foreigners is absolute and unqualified); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that Congress has the power to set
admission and exclusion rules).
20. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–17 (2000). See generally
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
21. STEEL, supra note 2, § 1:1.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.).
23. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1. Some have called immigration law
“equal in complexity to tax law.” Anna Marie Gallagher, Ethics, Professionalism, and
Immigration Law, 11-12 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (2011), Westlaw.
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A. Getting In: LPR Status
Anyone who has waited in line at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport
or another major international hub has witnessed how U.S. immigration law
divides people into categories. The first major division is between citizens
and noncitizens.24 Noncitizens are further categorized as immigrants,
nonimmigrants, or undocumented persons.25 Nonimmigrants include
students, tourists, business visitors, workers, and anyone coming to the
United States for temporary purposes.26 Immigrants, on the other hand,
intend to remain in the United States on a permanent basis,27 usually as
LPRs—popularly known as “green-card holders.”28 In general, after at
least five years as an LPR, a person can apply for naturalization and become
a citizen.29
To qualify for LPR status, a noncitizen must show eligibility based on
family- or employment-based ties to the United States, or a valid refugee or
asylee claim.30 Furthermore, she must prove that she is not “inadmissible”
for any reason.31 There are two different processes for obtaining LPR
status. A person residing abroad can obtain an immigrant visa from a
consular officer and present it to an inspector upon entering the United
States.32 Once the inspector authorizes the visa, the person has been
“admitted” as an LPR.33 Alternatively, a person already physically present
in the United States can obtain LPR status without leaving the country
through “adjustment of status”34 (AOS).
B. Kicked Out: Grounds for Removal
Immigration categories are important not only for practical reasons, but
also because they influence a person’s rights and responsibilities.35 For
example, a person on a student visa cannot generally accept employment in
the United States, while an LPR can work and must file income tax
returns.36 Only a citizen can vote in elections and pass citizenship on to her
24. The INA uses the term “alien” to describe noncitizens. Many immigration scholars
choose to avoid that dehumanizing term in favor of “noncitizen” except for when directly
quoting statutes or other sources. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1.
This Note follows that practice.
25. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:23.
26. INA § 101(a)(15)(A)–(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)–(V) (2012).
27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A).
28. Id. § 1101 (a)(20).
29. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 6.
30. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:24. Visas are subject to quota numbers. Id. § 2:25.
31. Id. § 2:26.
32. Id. § 7:1 (describing “consular processing”).
33. “Admission” and “admitted” mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). The meaning of the word “admitted” in various contexts is contentious.
See Elwin Griffith, The Meaning of Admission and the Effect of Waivers Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 55 HOW. L.J. 1, 6 (2011).
34. See STEEL, supra note 2, § 7:1.
35. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1373–77.
36. See id. at 250.
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children,37 and citizens have the strongest claim to remaining in the United
States permanently.38 Although LPRs can live and work in the United
States “permanently,” changes in immigration law have made the threat and
possibility of removal ever more present.
The INA lists several reasons a noncitizen may be removed, which
include public health concerns, criminal convictions, drug violations, and
national security.39 Noncitizens who have not been formally admitted to
the United States (such as those seeking admission from abroad or those
present without proper documentation) are subject to “inadmissibility” or
“exclusion” grounds under section 212(a).40 Noncitizens already admitted
to the United States are subject to deportability grounds set forth in section
237(a).41
Since its inception, the INA has evoked criticism for its harshness.42
Today’s INA is significantly tougher than the body of laws passed in 1952.
The Immigration Act of 1990 substantially restructured the grounds for
removal and made sweeping changes to deportation procedures and
remedies, making them far stricter, especially when related to drug or
criminal charges.43 Congress passed several restrictive revisions in the
decade that followed, which coincided with the heavy anti-immigrant
sentiment of the period.44 Most notably, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) greatly expanded the
grounds for removal.45 In particular, IIRIRA vastly expanded which crimes
fall under the definition of “aggravated felony.”46 Prior to 1996, only
murder and trafficking in drugs or firearms were considered aggravated

37. See id. at 1374.
38. It is difficult to strip someone of citizenship. See generally Charles E. Hooker, The
Past As Prologue: Schneiderman v. United States and Contemporary Questions of
Citizenship and Denationalization, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 305 (2005).
39. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012); INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 71.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2014), LexisNexis.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). Prior to 1996, noncitizens were subject to legal distinctions
depending on whether they were seeking entry into the United States or had already made it
inside. See Matthew F. Soares, Note, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach to Chevron
Deference in Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 929 (2014). “Exclusion”
referred to refusal to admit someone at the border, whereas “deportation” referred to removal
of a person already inside. Id. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 consolidated both into “removal” proceedings. Id. Nonetheless,
the original distinction remains functionally important because it determines which grounds
of removal apply. See id.; see also Matthew J. Geyer, Note, Involuntary Return and the
“Found in” Clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a): An Immigration Conundrum, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2091, 2097 (2015).
42. The INA was enacted over President Truman’s veto; Truman questioned the severity
of exclusion, deportation, and denaturalization grounds. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note
40, § 2.03.
43. STEEL, supra note 2, § 1:3.
44. See id.; see also Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital
Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV.
637, 662 (2012).
45. Soares, supra note 41, at 929.
46. STEEL, supra note 2, § 13:16.
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felonies.47 Now, the list of aggravated felonies includes murder; rape;
sexual abuse of a minor; illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,
firearms, or explosives; crimes of violence; theft offenses; and more.48 Any
noncitizen that is convicted of such a felony at any time after her admission
is removable.49
C. Waivers and Discretionary Relief
As a result of the expansion of the grounds for removal, thousands of
noncitizens now find themselves in removal proceedings each year,
searching for forms of relief.50 The Immigration Act of 1924 required the
deportation of any noncitizen present in the United States in violation of
immigration laws, without exception.51 Between 1940 and 1990, Congress
added several discretionary waivers of removal, only to pass legislation in
the 1990s and 2000s that significantly curtailed that relief.52 While the
grounds for removal have expanded, the possibilities for discretionary relief
continue to shrink.53
Relief provisions entail a balancing of misconduct against other factors,
such as the removable noncitizen’s long-term residence in the United
States, chance of persecution in a foreign country, or relationships with U.S.
citizen or LPR family members.54 A noncitizen must affirmatively apply
for relief in removal proceedings.55 Forms of relief include asylum,
Convention Against Torture waivers,56 and withholding of removal.57
Cancellation of removal—one of the most common forms of relief sought
in removal proceedings58—is available to noncitizens who have been in the
United States for a long time, have substantial ties to the country, and have

47. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469–70.
48. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). The Supreme Court has called
this section a “maze of statutory cross-references” because it defines “aggravated felony” by
reference to several other federal statutes. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563,
567 (2010).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii).
50. In fiscal year 2014, ICE completed a total of 315,943 removals. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 7 (2014), https://
www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4QQG-WNGK].
51. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162.
52. See Soares, supra note 41, at 927–29.
53. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (“The ‘drastic measure’ of
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted
of crimes.” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).
54. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 593.
55. Id.
56. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 33.10.
57. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
58. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK N1 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf [http://
perma.cc/KZZ5-3VSR].
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not committed certain crimes.59 A noncitizen who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time cannot receive cancellation of removal.60
Where a single criminal act makes a noncitizen both inadmissible and
ineligible for cancellation of removal, she may still qualify for a waiver on
the ground of inadmissibility.61 A common type of inadmissibility
waiver—a “hardship waiver”—applies when a noncitizen shows that her
citizen or LPR relatives would face extreme hardship if she were denied a
waiver.62 Hardship waivers are available for some criminal grounds,63
immigration fraud or misrepresentation,64 and unlawful presence bars.65
When determining whether a person’s removal will cause extreme hardship
to her qualifying relative, adjudicators weigh a list of factors compiled
through case law.66
There are several other waivers for specific grounds of inadmissibility.67
An applicant for any kind of waiver must first show that she is statutorily
eligible to apply for the waiver and then that she merits the favorable
exercise of discretion.68 The adjudicator weighs the negative factors in the
case—including the nature of the immigration violation, the applicant’s
criminal record, and any evidence of bad character—against the positive
equities—such as family ties, long-term residence, evidence of hardship,
history of employment, and good character.69 While this discretionary
process may forgive certain criminal grounds, many of the waivers are
statutorily unavailable to noncitizens who have been convicted of
aggravated felonies. Thus, one of the primary barriers to relief stems from
the INA’s expanded definition of “aggravated felony.”70
Nestled within this constellation of relief provisions lies the 212(h)
waiver of inadmissibility. Section 212(h) waivers are available to
noncitizens (1) whose offending activities (mostly prostitution related)

59. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Requirements differ for LPRs and non-LPRs.
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
60. See id. §§ 1229b(a)(3), 1229b(b).
61. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12.
62. Only certain types of relationships qualify. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (defining a
qualifying relative as a U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, son, or daughter of the applicant).
The applicant cannot prove eligibility based on her own hardship, with the exception of selfpetitioners covered by the Violence Against Women Act. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra
note 40, § 63.12.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
64. Id. § 1182(i).
65. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
66. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12. Factors include the extent of the
qualifying relative’s family ties in the United States that might be broken if she relocated
with the waiver applicant, the qualifying relative’s ties to her U.S. community, the qualifying
relative’s lack of ties to the foreign country or inability to speak the language, the conditions
in the foreign country to which the relative might relocate with the waiver applicant, and
significant health or psychological factors. Id.
67. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k) (documentary problems); id. § 1182(c) (LPRs guilty of
certain offenses pre-IIRIRA); id. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (terrorism).
68. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 63.12.
69. Id.
70. Soares, supra note 41, at 929.
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occurred more than fifteen years earlier and who show that they are
rehabilitated; (2) who have qualifying relatives who would suffer extreme
hardship upon denial of the waiver; or (3) who were victims of domestic
violence.71
The inadmissible noncitizen must show that she falls under one of the
three enumerated categories and that she is not otherwise barred from
applying for the waiver.72 Prior to IIRIRA, the only noncitizens statutorily
barred from receiving 212(h) waivers were those who had “been convicted
of (or who ha[d] admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or
criminal acts involving torture.”73 With IIRIRA however, Congress
expanded the category of noncitizens ineligible for the waiver as follows:
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien
who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such
admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the
alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a
period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation
of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall
have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or
deny a waiver under this subsection.74

The controversy discussed in this Note stems from differing
interpretations of the italicized phrase above. The Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (“the majority
courts”) have ruled that an aggravated felony or lack of continuous
residence bars relief under section 212(h) only for those noncitizens who
are admitted to the country as LPRs following inspection at a port of
entry.75 In removal proceedings outside of those circuits, the BIA holds
that relief is unavailable to all LPRs who were convicted of an aggravated
felony or who failed to meet the residence requirements after acquiring LPR
status, regardless of the manner in which they gained that status.76 The
Eighth Circuit alone has sided with the BIA.77

71. Brief of the Am. Immigration Council and the Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n As
Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Roberts v. Holder, 745
F.3d 928 (2014) (No. 12-3359), http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/Roberts%20
Amicus%20Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TGK-U7ZN]. All of the noncitizens in cases that
make up the circuit split discussed in Part II fall under category (2). See infra Part II.
72. The Attorney General may then exercise discretion to waive the noncitizen’s
inadmissibility. A person in removal proceedings may seek a 212(h) waiver concurrent to an
AOS or re-AOS, not on a “standalone” basis. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 133
(B.I.A. 2013).
73. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(d)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5077.
74. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (emphasis added).
75. See infra Part II.A, II.B.
76. See infra Part II.C.
77. See infra Part II.C.
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D. Judicial Review of Removal Orders
and Applications for Relief
In addition to the expansion of the grounds for removal and bars to relief,
two other factors make it difficult to challenge a removal order. First,
judges have historically been deferential to immigration agencies. Second,
Congress has narrowed the scope of judicial review in the immigration
context.
Congress has delegated immigration authority to several administrative
agencies.78 In particular, the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR), under the Department of Justice (DOJ), administers the
immigration court system.79 EOIR consists of a national network of
immigration judges (IJs) who preside over removal proceedings.80 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) summons a person to appear at a
removal hearing by issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA); an IJ then
determines whether the person fits within one or more of the alleged
grounds for removal and whether she is eligible for, and deserving of, the
relief for which she has applied.81 The IJ may find that (1) the person is not
removable, (2) she is removable and ineligible for discretionary relief
(resulting in a removal order), or (3) she is removable but qualifies for
discretionary relief (resulting in the termination of proceedings).82 The
DHS or the noncitizen may appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.83
The BIA is the “highest administrative body for interpreting and applying
immigration laws.”84 The agency generally does not conduct courtroom
hearings, but instead decides appeals by reviewing the record.85 It defers to
the IJ’s findings of fact unless there is clear error.86 Since 2000, the BIA’s
structure and procedures have changed significantly.87 Responding to an
enormous backlog of cases, the BIA implemented several streamlining
regulations, which included replacing three-judge panels with single judges
78. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), State, Labor, Justice, and Health and
Human Services share oversight of immigration procedures and policies. LEGOMSKY &
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 5. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) reorganized the
agency apparatus, replacing the Immigration and Naturalization Service with two separate
entities within DHS: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). Id. at 2–3. CBP is responsible for enforcement at borders and ports of
entry; ICE manages interior enforcement, including investigations, detention, and
intelligence gathering. Id. at 3. Additionally, the HSA created the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service to handle immigration benefit applications. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 515.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb 6. 2015), http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/biainfo.htm [http://perma.cc/F4Y8-GXZ4].
85. Id. (calling the process a “paper review”); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra
note 3, at 4.
86. STEEL, supra note 2, § 2:7.
87. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent
Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 327
(2012).
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and allowing the BIA to issue one-line summary affirmances of IJs’
decisions without endorsing or suggesting alternatives to IJs’ rationales.88
Changes in the BIA’s administrative procedures have resulted in a flood
of immigration appeals to the federal courts.89 A noncitizen may petition
for review of a BIA decision in the applicable U.S. court of appeals.90 The
level of deference that federal courts should afford BIA decisions has been
a longstanding source of debate91 and informs the current conflict in the
courts of appeals over whether to agree with the BIA’s construction of
section 212(h).
The judicially created plenary power doctrine holds that Congress has
broad power to regulate immigration; under this view, the executive branch,
by extension, deserves substantial deference in setting and enforcing
immigration policy.92 This broad deference comes from the notion that
immigration is unique.93 As a result, the Supreme Court has not applied
due process or equal protection safeguards as stringently in the immigration
context as in other areas.94 Some scholars have termed this deviation from
legal norms “immigration exceptionalism.”95 However, some scholars have
suggested that the plenary power doctrine’s grip on immigration
88. Id. at 318; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2011).
89. Rana, supra note 87, at 327.
90. The government may not make appeals higher than the BIA. BIA decisions are
ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court. See STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38.
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits Executive
Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future Challenges, 27 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 55 (2012) (noting that debate over plenary power and the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches is “still very much alive in both classrooms
and courtrooms”).
92. Id. at 40–41, 55–56; Soares, supra note 41, at 926; see also Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate
immigration extends to the power to enforce immigration laws, which it may do by
delegating to agency officials the power to set procedures).
93. The Court has offered several rationales for the plenary power doctrine; one such
rationale is that immigration policy entails political questions because it implicates foreign
affairs. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260–78.
94. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned.”); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
95. See e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New
Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 59 (2015). But Gabriel
Chin argues the plenary power doctrine is nothing more than dicta; historic immigration
decisions holding discriminatory and racist congressional action immune from judicial
review were simply products of their time:
At the time they were decided, many of the terrible immigration cases could have
come out the same way even if they involved the rights of citizens under domestic
constitutional law. . . . There is no need for a special plenary power doctrine or
other constitutional rule to explain these cases . . . .
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?: A Tentative Apology and Prediction
for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
257, 258 (2000).
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jurisprudence—at least in the Supreme Court—may be loosening.96 Some
call the doctrine as good as dead,97 while others believe unscrupulous
judicial deference to the BIA continues.98
The Court’s framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretation
from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.99 has
often worked to reinforce and bolster the plenary power doctrine in the
immigration context, restraining a reviewing court’s analysis of BIA
decisions centering on interpretations of the INA.100 However, a Chevron
analysis does not preclude a judge from overturning a BIA construction—
especially if the judge finds that the statute clearly supports an
interpretation contrary to the agency’s.101
In addition to doctrinal restrictions on judicial review, Congress has
enacted INA provisions that restrict judges’ role in reviewing BIA
decisions. IIRIRA drastically restructured the relationship between the
courts and the BIA.102 For example, although noncitizens may appeal BIA
decisions to the courts of appeals, federal judges generally do not have
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decisions.103 Instead, the
federal courts only review questions of law.104 This practice seriously
limits the amount of judicial review available to persons challenging orders
of removal or denials of discretionary relief.105

96. See generally Motomura, supra note 20.
97. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 95, at 61; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002).
98. See Rana, supra note 87, at 343; Soares, supra note 41.
99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron holds that, at Step One, a court should employ
traditional tools of statutory construction to determine Congress’s intent and to determine
whether the statute speaks directly to the issue at hand. Id. at 843 n.9. If congressional intent
is clear, the court must follow it. Id. at 842–43. If the statute is ambiguous, the reviewing
court moves to Step Two, determining whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable; if so, the court must defer to the agency. Id.
100. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (noting that the BIA
deserves special deference because immigration deals with sensitive political functions
implicating questions of foreign relations).
101. For one of the first cases applying Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA
and overturning the agency’s construction of an asylum statute because contrary
congressional intent was clear, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
102. See Austen Ishii, There and Back, Now and Then: IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and the
Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 955–56
(2014). IIRIRA, combined with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
and the REAL ID Act, imposed many unprecedented restrictions on review by the courts of
appeals over individual deportation and removal orders. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 40,
§ 104.13[2] (listing many of the new restrictions).
103. Decisions related to waivers, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and AOS
are discretionary. STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38; see, e.g., INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)
(2012) (stating that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney
General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection”).
104. See, e.g., Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v.
Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 384 (4th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 538 (5th Cir.
2008).
105. STEEL, supra note 2, § 14:38.
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It is against this backdrop of broadening grounds for removal, narrowing
relief, and restricted judicial review that the conflict over section 212(h) has
materialized.
II. THE 212(H) CONFLICT
The BIA follows a court of appeals’s decision overruling its own
determination within that circuit but is free to follow its own interpretation
elsewhere, which can lead to inconsistent applications of immigration law
in different parts of the country.106 Nine courts of appeals have declined to
defer to the BIA on its interpretation of section 212(h), while one court has
sided with the agency—creating a framework in which the question of
whether noncitizens can remain in the United States may turn on where
they live.107 Part II details the legal conflict over whether noncitizens that
adjusted to LPR status within the United States are eligible to apply for
212(h) waivers for committing certain crimes or not meeting continuous
residence requirements. Part II.A analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision on
the issue, which eight other circuits have followed. Part II.B describes the
arguments that the majority of the courts of appeals have presented for why
LPRs who have adjusted status post-admission should be eligible for 212(h)
waivers. Part II.C presents the contrary arguments raised by the BIA, the
Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting opinions in the courts of appeals. Lastly,
Part II.D presents theories on the current state of Supreme Court deference
to the BIA based on the 2009 to 2013 Terms.
A. The Question’s Debut in the Fifth Circuit
The first federal appellate court to address the issue of LPRs’ eligibility
to apply for 212(h) waivers was the Fifth Circuit in Martinez v. Mukasey.108
Jose Martinez lawfully entered the United States from Argentina on a
nonimmigrant visitor visa in 1980 and adjusted his status in 1990.109
Martinez later married a U.S. citizen and fathered two U.S.-citizen
children.110 In 2001, he pled guilty to bank fraud and served prison time.
Shortly after his release, ICE officials took Martinez into custody and
initiated removal proceedings, alleging that he had committed an
aggravated felony.111 Martinez argued that his crime did not constitute an
aggravated felony, but he also applied for a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility

106. Soares, supra note 41, at 937–38.
107. The BIA currently follows its own more narrow interpretation of section 212(h)—
that the aggravated felony and continuous presence bar applies to all LPRs regardless of how
they gained that status—in the First, Eighth, and Twelfth Circuits. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
108. 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 536.
110. Id.
111. ICE relied on INA section 101 (a)(43)(M)(i) (allowing removal for “fraud or deceit
in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”), which made Martinez
removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). Martinez, 519 F.3d at 536.
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on the basis of extreme hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife and children.112
The IJ held (and the BIA affirmed) that Martinez was removable and
statutorily ineligible to seek relief under section 212(h) as an LPR with an
aggravated felony conviction.113 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overruled the
BIA’s interpretation of the 212(h) felony bar, holding that Martinez was
eligible for a 212(h) waiver despite agreeing that his conviction was an
aggravated felony.114
The court noted that, while it could not review a discretionary decision to
deny or grant a 212(h) waiver, it had jurisdiction to review questions of law
involving the BIA’s construction of section 212(h).115 The legal question at
issue was whether the statute’s language—“previously been admitted to the
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
[and] . . . since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of
an aggravated felony”—barred LPRs who had adjusted status inside the
country from qualifying for a 212(h) waiver.116 Martinez contended that,
even if his conviction was an aggravated felony, he was eligible for a
212(h) waiver because he was never admitted as an LPR; rather, he adjusted
status ten years after his initial admission as a nonimmigrant.117 The BIA
argued that any LPR convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
acquiring that status was barred from using section 212(h).118
The court cited Chevron as guiding its analysis of whether it should defer
to the agency’s interpretation, noting that, in general, the court was
constrained by the need to afford substantial deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA.119 Applying the statutory definitions of
“admission” and “admitted” to the text of section 212(h), the court found
that “admitted” as used in the aggravated felony bar provision referred to a
noncitizen’s lawful entry into the country while holding LPR status.120 It
concluded that the statute’s plain language unambiguously demonstrated
that Congress did not intend to bar those LPRs who adjusted status post-

112. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 537.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 541–46.
115. Id. at 541.
116. Id. at 542.
117. Id.
118. The BIA relied on Matter of Rosas, where it held that a noncitizen who, unlike
Martinez, entered without inspection and later adjusted to LPR status could be subject to
removal proceedings under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on having an aggravated
felony conviction. Matter of Rosas, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc). It
considered LPRs who obtained status through AOS to have an “admission” for that
particular provision but declined to resolve the meaning of “admission” in other contexts. Id.
In Martinez’s case, the BIA extended that reasoning to section 212(h). Martinez, 519 F.3d at
542. The Fifth Circuit noted that the language of INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) differs from
section 212(h). Id. It says that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission is deportable.” Id.
119. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 542. It emphasized that “[r]ecitation of this substantialdeference standard, without more, is insufficient to require our deference in this instance.”
Id.
120. Id. at 544; see also infra Part II.B.1.
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entry from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility.121 Furthermore, reading the
statute to allow those who adjusted to LPR status subsequent to entry to
apply for 212(h) waivers comported with the immigration rule of lenity.122
B. Courts Following the Fifth Circuit
Since Martinez, nine other courts of appeals have considered the question
of whether the aggravated felony and continuous presence bars to 212(h)
eligibility apply to LPRs who adjusted status post-entry.123 Besides the
Eighth Circuit, which diverged from the majority in March 2014, each court
has adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, finding that the provision at issue
in section 212(h) unambiguously bars only the applications of those LPRs
who acquired status through consular processing.124 Although Martinez
considered the question in light of a petitioner who had entered the country
lawfully in a different status than LPR, courts have applied the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation to both LPRs who were inspected and admitted by
an immigration officer in some other status125 as well as those who entered
the United States illegally and later adjusted status.126 All of the majority
courts applied Chevron and found the language of section 212(h) to be
unambiguous.127 This section presents their arguments.
1. The Definition Section of the INA
In considering whether adjustment to LPR status while already living in
the United States qualifies as having previously been “admitted” to the

121. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 546. The court cited Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992), for the principle that a court must begin with the plain
language of the text to get to congressional intent: “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.” Id. at 543.
122. Id. at 544; see also infra Part II.B.2.
123. In most cases, the BIA deemed respondents ineligible for 212(h) waivers on the
basis of aggravated felonies, but one had been found ineligible for failure to meet the sevenyear continuous presence requirement. See Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 481 (3d Cir.
2012).
124. Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015); Husic v. Holder, 776
F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014); Negrete-Ramirez
v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014); Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir.
2013); Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012); Hanif, 694 F.3d 479; Bracamontes v.
Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011).
125. See, e.g., Husic, 776 F.3d at 60 (petitioner entered on B-2 visa, later received
asylum, and adjusted to LPR); Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 516 (petitioner entered on
nonimmigrant visa and adjusted by marriage); Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1049 (petitioner
entered on B-2 visa and adjusted to LPR shortly after); Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 791
(petitioner entered on B-2 visa and adjusted through marriage).
126. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 347 (petitioner crossed border illegally but adjusted status
pursuant to an employment-based petition); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 481 (petitioner entered on
fraudulent visa and obtained marriage-based adjustment); Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 382
(petitioner entered without inspection and adjusted fourteen years later); Lanier, 631 F.3d at
1365 (petitioner entered without inspection and adjusted to LPR four years later).
127. See, e.g., Husic, 776 F.3d at 66 (“[T]he statutory text is unambiguous.”); Stanovsek,
768 F.3d at 516 (noting “inescapably clear language”); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 481 (stating that
the language was “clear and unambiguous on its face”).
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country “for permanent residence” under section 212(h), the Eleventh
Circuit emphasized that, in writing the eligibility bar, Congress used two
terms of art that it “expressly defined” in section 101 of the INA.128
Interpreting the statute required the court to apply the given definitions and
“to assess the effect of each term on the meaning of [section 212(h)] as a
whole.”129 The rest of the majority courts similarly felt constrained to
apply the defined meanings of “admitted” and “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.”130
Section 101(a)(13)(A) of the INA defines “admitted” and “admission” as
“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.”131 The courts read the word
“admitted” to contemplate a “physical crossing of the border following the
sanction and approval of United States authorities”132 and to exclude postentry AOS.133 The Fifth Circuit pointed to legislative history to support
this reading.134 The court noted that after IIRIRA’s passage, members of
Congress attempted, through the Immigration Technical Corrections Act of
1997, to amend section 101(a)(13)(A)’s definition of “admission” and
“admitted” to explicitly include AOS.135 Thus, at least some members of
Congress did not consider the enacted definition of “admitted” to include
post-entry AOS; the fact that the proposed amendment was rejected showed
that the omission was intentional.136
In section 101(a)(20), Congress defined “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence” as “the status of having been lawfully accorded the
privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in
accordance with the immigration laws.”137 Lanier v. Attorney General138
took this definition to describe “a particular immigration status, without any
regard for how or when that status is obtained.”139 The court reasoned that
128. Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1366.
129. Id.
130. See Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053 (noting that when a statute includes an
explicit definition, the court must follow the definition “unless doing so is not possible in a
particular context”); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 484 (“Absent any indication to the contrary, we must
presume that Congress intended to give those terms the meaning ascribed to them elsewhere
in the statute.”); see also Husic, 776 F.3d at 63–64; Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517; NegreteRamirez, 741 F.3d at 1052; Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 793–94.
131. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).
132. Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); see also NegreteRamirez, 741 F.3d at 1051 (deciding “admission” means “passage into the country from
abroad at a port of entry”).
133. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1051; Papazoglou, 725 F.3d at 793–94;
Leiba, 699 F.3d at 350–51; Hanif, 694 F.3d at 484–85; Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 385–86;
Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1366–67; Martinez, 519 F.3d at 543–44.
134. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545.
135. Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1997, H.R. 2413, 105th Cong. § 4(a)
(1997). The proposed amendment would have added, “(D) In the case of an alien adjusted to
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, such alien shall be regarded
as having been admitted on the date of such adjustment.”
136. Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545.
137. INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(2) (2012).
138. 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011).
139. Id. at 1366.
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the phrase encompassed all persons with LPR status. If section 212(h) used
that term alone, it would mean that all LPRs were barred from relief.140
However, using the statutorily defined terms “admission” and “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence” in conjunction described a particular
status and the process used to obtain that status, thus narrowing the class of
LPRs barred from seeking the waiver.141 Using both terms together was a
“very strong indication that [Congress] intended that each term would serve
a distinct purpose.”142
With the statutory definitions substituted into the provision in question,
section 212(h) reads:
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien
who has previously lawfully entered into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer as an alien with
the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant . . . .143

Those LPRs who entered the country in a different status (or without
status) and did not become LPRs until after adjustment did not have an
“admission” in LPR status within the plain meaning of section 212(h).144
Therefore, they remained eligible to seek a waiver of inadmissibility even if
they had been convicted of aggravated felonies or failed to meet the
continuous residence requirement.145 This reading, said the Fourth Circuit,
“accords section 212(h) its plain meaning and properly utilizes the
definitions of terms Congress provided in the INA.”146
Furthermore, if Congress wanted to bar all LPRs from applying for a
212(h) waiver, it could have done so using much simpler language.147 For
example, Congress could have said: “No waiver shall be granted under this
subsection in the case of a lawful permanent resident.”148 If Congress
meant to withhold 212(h) relief from all LPRs who failed to meet the
statutory conditions, the phrase “previously . . . admitted to the United
States” would be mere surplusage.149 By employing both defined terms
together, rather than using a simpler construction, Congress indicated its

140. Id.
141. Id.; Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Each defined term
adds its own meaning to that phrase: the first refers to a type of entry into this country, while
the second refers to a certain status . . . .”); see also Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d
1047, 1051–54 (4th Cir. 2014).
142. Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346, 355 (4th Cir. 2012).
143. Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Husic v.
Holder, 776 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2015); Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517.
144. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 385.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517; Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047,
1053 (4th Cir. 2014); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2011).
148. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 517.
149. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 386. Interpretations that would render certain statutory
language redundant or otherwise superfluous are disfavored. See, e.g., Husic v. Holder, 776
F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2015); Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053.
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intent to bar only those LPRs who initially entered the country as such.150
The courts presumed that, when writing a statute, Congress acts
intentionally.151 The Seventh Circuit concluded, “We will not interpret a
statute in a manner that renders part of it irrelevant, particularly where, as
here, the statute has an unambiguous meaning if we simply apply the
definition provided in the statute itself.”152 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
expressed that “[i]n the face of a statute’s unambiguous language, the BIA
may not make its own administrative amendments,” and the court must give
effect to the statute as written, even if the court or the agency disagrees with
what Congress expressed.153 If Congress did not in fact intend what it said
in plain words, it was up to Congress—and not the court or the BIA—to
amend the statute.154
2. The Immigration Rule of Lenity
As further support for a narrow reading of the statute, several courts
invoked the immigration rule of lenity.155 In criminal law, the rule of lenity
requires courts to construe ambiguities in favor of the defendant because of
the “overwhelming constitutional concerns associated with punishment and
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property.”156 Although
deportation and pre-removal detention are not considered criminal
punishments,157 the Supreme Court has said that, in the immigration
context, ambiguities affecting deportation should be resolved in favor of the
noncitizen because of the drastic consequences of removal.158
Although the courts did not find any ambiguity around the term
“admitted” in section 212(h), application of the rule of lenity—reading the
phrase to exclude AOS subsequent to entry—provided an additional
argument for narrowly construing the statute in favor of allowing the
respondents to seek a waiver of inadmissibility.159

150. Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 2012).
151. See, e.g., id.
152. Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2013).
153. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 387.
154. Id. at 389.
155. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014); Lanier v.
Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532,
544 (5th Cir. 2008).
156. Soares, supra note 41, at 933; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of
Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515 (2003).
157. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). Many scholars have
called for stronger procedural safeguards for detained immigrants, arguing that deportation is
akin to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Immigration
Detention As Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New
Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 28
IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 679 (2007).
158. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also Slocum,
supra note 156, at 521–23; Soares, supra note 41, at 933.
159. See, e.g., Martinez, 519 F.3d at 544.
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C. The BIA and the Eighth Circuit
Just over two years after the Martinez decision, in Matter of
Koljenovic,160 the BIA came to the opposite conclusion on 212(h) eligibility
bars. Unlike Martinez, who entered the United States with a valid
nonimmigrant visa and later adjusted status, Koljenovic had entered without
inspection.161 He later adjusted status and was convicted of second-degree
organized fraud three years later.162 Koljenovic found himself in removal
proceedings when he sought to reenter the country after a brief trip
abroad.163 The IJ found that Koljenovic was ineligible for a 212(h) waiver
because he did not have the requisite seven years of lawful continuous
presence from the date of his AOS.164 On appeal, Koljenovic argued that
the continuous presence bar should not apply to him because his AOS
should not be considered an “admission” as an LPR.165
The BIA agreed that Koljenovic’s adjustment was not an “admission” by
the “limited definitions” in section 101(a)(13)(A).166 Nonetheless, it argued
that Koljenovic’s adjustment was an admission for purposes of section
212(h), reading that provision in the context of the INA as a whole and with
legislative history in mind.167 The BIA had held in prior cases that an AOS
could be an “admission” in some contexts: in Matter of Rosas,168 it found
that a noncitizen who entered without inspection and later adjusted to LPR
status had been “admitted” as an LPR for purposes of section 237(a)(2); in
Matter of Shanu,169 in the same context, it found a person admitted as a
nonimmigrant visitor who subsequently adjusted status also had been
“admitted” as an LPR upon his AOS.170
The BIA distinguished Martinez because the respondent in that case had
been lawfully admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor and later adjusted his
status.171 The Fifth Circuit had not considered whether its holding would
apply in a case like Koljenovic’s, where the noncitizen had never previously
been admitted in any lawful status.172 Applying the Martinez rule in every
case, the agency said, would create an absurd result: LPRs like Koljenovic

160. 25 I. & N. Dec. 219 (B.I.A. 2010).
161. Id. at 219.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 219–20.
165. Id. at 220.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 220–25.
168. 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc).
169. 23 I. & N. Dec. 754 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated, Aremu v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 450
F.3d 578 (4th Cir. 2006).
170. The BIA noted other sections of the INA that equate adjustment and admission:
sections 245(a) and (i) authorize the Attorney General to adjust a person’s status to that of an
“alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” and section 245(b) instructs the Attorney
General to treat the date AOS was granted as the date of lawful admission for permanent
residence for recording purposes. Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 221 (B.I.A.
2010).
171. Id. at 223.
172. Id.
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would be left without any date of admission within the meaning of section
101(a)(13), which would make them subject to grounds of inadmissibility
and ineligible for various forms of relief.173 Such a result would be
inconsistent with the overall structure of the INA and would create
incongruities among its statutory provisions.174 Instead, the BIA found that
resolving the statutory provision to bar all LPRs who failed the aggravated
felony and continuous residence requirements was “far more consistent
with the overall structure of the Act regarding the eligibility of aliens for
relief under the relevant provisions of section 212(h) and for other
analogous relief.”175 Applying Matter of Rosas, the BIA concluded that no
LPR who lacked the requisite continuous presence or failed to meet other
statutory conditions could be eligible for a 212(h) waiver, regardless of how
the LPR was “admitted” to that status.176 The agency has since reaffirmed
that holding in jurisdictions where controlling circuit law does not hold
otherwise.177
Only one court of appeals has chosen to side with the BIA and to bar all
LPRs from applying for 212(h) relief if they have an aggravated felony or
lack continuous presence. In March 2014, the Eighth Circuit issued Roberts
v. Holder.178 Unlike the respondent in Koljenovic, Shaun Roberts had been
inspected and admitted at a port of entry as a nonimmigrant visitor, later
adjusting status and becoming an LPR.179 The court declined to follow the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits—which by that time followed
Martinez—and instead became the first court of appeals to find section
212(h) ambiguous.180 Despite the fact that it was departing from its sister
circuits, the court wrote a brief opinion. It argued that, reading section
212(h) in isolation,
one might conclude, as our sister circuits have, that the meaning of
“admitted” is clear . . . [and] apply the aggravated felony bar only to those
who obtained LPR status at the port of entry to the United States.
However, the immigration statutes as a whole . . . do not treat the words
“admitted” and “admission” consistently.181

Section 212(h) was thus susceptible to multiple interpretations.182 Moving
to Chevron Step Two, the court found the BIA’s construction of the
provision reasonable because the INA as a whole might fairly be read to
treat post-entry adjustment as a proxy for inspection at the border.183
Therefore, it deferred to the agency.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225.
Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 789 (B.I.A. 2012).
745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014).
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 932–33.
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The Government, the Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting judges in the
majority courts all argued that section 212(h) was ambiguous as to which
LPRs were barred from eligibility and that the BIA’s interpretation should
therefore get Chevron deference.184 In arguing that the statute was
ambiguous, they invoked the absurdity doctrine, referenced the meaning of
“admission” in other INA provisions, and invoked legislative history and
purpose. This section presents those arguments.
1. The Meaning of “Admission” in Other Provisions of the INA
Makes the Use of “Admitted” in 212(h) Ambiguous
The Eighth Circuit held that “previously been admitted . . . as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence” was ambiguous without
explicitly explaining how.185 In Bracamontes v. Holder,186 the dissent
offered an explanation: section 212(h) used the term “admitted” to refer to
an “entry” but also used the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence,” which refers to AOS.187 While the majority read those terms
together to clearly refer to LPRs who had not entered the country in that
status, the dissent argued that the parallel use of “admission” in one sense to
refer to an “entry” and in another sense to refer to “status” created
confusion and ambiguity as to the meaning of the word “admitted” in the
provision.188 The BIA resolved that ambiguity by reading section 212(h)
consistently with other INA provisions that used AOS as a proxy for
admission.189
The Government frequently argued that the statutory provision in section
212(h) cannot be read in isolation but instead must be read in the context of
the entire INA.190 Several other provisions in the INA consider an AOS an
“admission,” and the 212(h) bar should be read that way as well.191
In Hanif v. Attorney General,192 the Government pointed out that section
245(b) of the INA directs the Attorney General to treat the date that a
noncitizen adjusted status as the date of lawful admission for permanent
residence for recording purposes.193 Therefore, it argued, the petitioner’s
AOS could be read as an “admission” as an LPR for section 212(h)
purposes.194 Similarly, the Government in Leiba v. Holder195 argued that

184. See, e.g., Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 2012) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. See Roberts, 745 F.3d at 932.
186. 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012).
187. Id. at 390, 392 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 390.
190. See, e.g., Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 2012).
191. See, e.g., id. at 485; Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 2008).
192. 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012).
193. Id. at 485.
194. Id. The majority responded that the recording provision in section 245(b) was
simply a “ministerial provision relating to the monitoring and control of the number of visas
available in any given year, rather than an effort by Congress to amend the definitions of
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the use of AOS as a proxy for admission in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) should
inform the reading of 212(h).196
The dissent in Stanovsek v. Holder197 pointed to three provisions in the
INA that use the same “alien . . . admitted . . . as an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence” language as section 212(h) but interpret the
noncitizen’s AOS as an admission: sections 201(c), 216, and 216A.198
Section 201(c) involves computing the number of family-sponsored visas
available in a given year and says that a noncitizen “subsequently admitted
as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” shall not again be
counted as “admitted.”199 Sections 216 and 216A say that LPRs who
entered the country and later adjusted status based upon marriage to a U.S.
citizen shall be considered to “have been admitted” as LPRs.200 The dissent
argued that, in these provisions, the language mirrored section 212(h) but
allowed for an AOS to equal an admission—the distinction between
physical entry and status did not matter in those statutes, so it should not
matter in 212(h).201
The majority courts rejected arguments that the way “admission” was
used in other parts of the INA had any impact on the reading of section
212(h). According to the majority courts, there are other sections of the
INA where the absence of an “admission” as defined in section
101(a)(13)(A) might permit using the date of AOS as the date of admission
for practical purposes, such as in removal provisions or cancellation of
removal.202 But in those provisions, the terms “admission” or “admitted”
are followed by “in any status” or left unqualified.203 In section 212(h), the
concurrent use of “admitted” and “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence”—terms of art separately defined in the INA—works
differently.204

‘admitted’ and ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ set forth in § 1101(a).” Id.; see
also Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2014).
195. 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012).
196. Id. at 354.
197. 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014).
198. Id. at 521–22 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 522.
200. Id. at 523.
201. Id. at 521–22. The majority in Stanovsek analyzed each section in turn, finding that
because those statutes dealt with “admission” in very specific contexts—parole and
naturalization—they did not shed light on the terms’ meanings in the context of section
212(h). Id. at 520.
202. See, e.g., Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014); Leiba v.
Holder, 699 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2012).
203. Negrete-Ramirez, 741 F.3d at 1053.
204. Id. at 1052–54; see also Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 486 (3d Cir. 2012)
(noting that the “omission of this additional modifier creates a significant distinction”);
Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir. 2008).
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2. Absurdity Arguments
In arguing against the majority construction of section 212(h), the
Government frequently invoked the absurdity doctrine,205 arguing that a
plain reading of the provision would lead to ridiculous results that Congress
could not have intended. Their arguments pointed to two bizarre results in
particular: impermissible incongruities with other INA provisions and
irrational distinctions among different types of LPRs.
First, the Government argued that the meaning of “admission” in section
212(h) should be read the same way as in other sections of the INA that
treat an AOS as an admission.206 Relatedly, the Government argued that
failing to read section 212(h) that way would lead to absurd results and to
incongruities with other provisions of the INA, because some noncitizens
would be left without any official admission. In Leiba, where the petitioner
had entered the United States illegally and adjusted status through an
employment-based petition, the Government argued that applying
Congress’s definition of “admission” literally would produce the absurd
result that those who never lawfully entered the country would be ineligible
to apply for cancellation of removal under INA section 240A (because they
had no admission) but would be eligible for a 212(h) waiver.207 The
Government presumed that Congress intended to create congruity between
sections 212(h) and 240A.208 The Government reasoned that, as the
requirements in section 240A applied to all LPRs regardless of their mode
of attaining that status, the 212(h) continuous residence requirements
should also apply to all LPRs.209 In considering this argument, the majority
courts found that Congress clearly did not intend the word “admitted” to
read the same way in both contexts. The sections differed in a significant
way: in 240A the seven-year continuous-residence requirement applied to
LPRs “after having been admitted in any status.”210 In 240A, Congress did
not use “admitted” in conjunction with “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.”211 The “omission of this additional modifier” created a
distinction between the two sections.212 Additionally, although it might be
205. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486–87 (1868) (“General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions
to its language, which would avoid results of this character.”).
206. See supra notes 191–201 and accompanying text.
207. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354.
208. The BIA pointed to a House Conference Report to support its presumption: “The
managers intend that the provisions governing continuous residence set forth in INA section
240A as enacted by this legislation shall be applied as well for purposes of waivers under
INA section 212(h).” Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 222 (B.I.A. 2010) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 228 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)).
209. Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354.
210. Id.; Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2012).
211. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 485.
212. Id. at 486. Because Congress amended INA sections 212(h), 240A, and
101(a)(13)(A) at the same time, these textual differences were likely intentional. Id. at 484.
When Congress includes particular language in one section and omits it in another, it acts
purposefully in its disparate exclusion or inclusion. See Leiba, 699 F.3d at 354.
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strange that LPRs who entered illegally and later adjusted status were left
with no technical admission, the court in Hanif stated that Congress had
“long been aware of the fact that aliens may enter the country without
inspection and later adjust.”213 While the situation was “awkward,” it was
not absurd; the courts would not substitute their judgment for that of
Congress.214
Second, the BIA and the Government pointed out that barring some
LPRs from 212(h) eligibility but not others led to absurd distinctions—both
(1) between those who entered illegally and those who entered lawfully, and
(2) between LPRs who went through consular processing and those who
adjusted status.
In Koljenovic, the BIA emphasized that Congress could not have
intended for a noncitizen who entered the country illegally, and then
received the privilege of adjusting status, to be immune from restrictions on
seeking 212(h) protection, while leaving a person who had gone through
consular processing to be admitted as an LPR to suffer those restrictions.215
The Government and dissents found it unfair that the majority interpretation
of section 212(h) would impose harsher terms on those who entered legally
than on any other category of entrants, “including not only those who enter,
for example, as tourists and later adjust their status, but even those who
sneak across the border; those who overstay their visas; or those who
violate any other type of entry requirement—by lying about qualifications,
past history, or affiliations for example.”216 Judge Niemeyer, dissenting in
Bracamontes, expressed that “[i]t is difficult to fathom why Congress
would have wished to bar aliens who lawfully entered the United States
with [LPR] status from reaping the benefits of section 212(h)[,] while
permitting aliens who illegally entered the country” to reap those
Such a reading of the statute would create perverse
benefits.217
incentives.218
The BIA also reasoned that Congress could not have intended to
distinguish those who had acquired LPR status through consular processing
from those “whose admission occurred through adjustment of status.”219
The dissent in Stanovsek argued that there is no material difference between
one who enters the country as an LPR and one who adjusts status following
entry, so there is no sensible explanation for why the statute would treat

213. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 487.
214. Id.
215. Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 223 (B.I.A. 2010).
216. Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J., dissenting). The
dissent framed this disparate treatment as an absurdity rather than an equal protection issue.
Courts have consistently rejected equal protection challenges to section 212(h). See, e.g.,
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 388–89 n.5 (4th Cir. 2012); Hanif, 694 F.3d at 486
(finding section 212(h) constitutional under rational basis review because Congress could
have had good reasons for the 212(h) distinction).
217. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 393 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
218. Id.
219. Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 224.
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LPRs disparately based on the procedure used to acquire that status.220 In
Martinez, the Government argued that IIRIRA reforms were meant to
expedite removal of “criminal aliens”; it would therefore be unreasonable to
suggest that Congress intended to distinguish between LPRs guilty of the
same crimes based on whether they entered the country as LPRs or adjusted
status post-entry.221
The Fifth Circuit majority found that the distinctions above were not
necessarily absurd.222 There were rational reasons for Congress to
distinguish between different types of LPRs based on how they acquired
that status.223 First, it was possible that Congress intended to take an
incremental approach to reaching its ultimate goals.224 Second, Congress
may have felt that LPRs who adjusted status inside the country rather than
entering as green-card holders were more deserving of eligibility for a
waiver because they likely grew up in this country, developed strong ties
here, and had more citizen relatives who would be adversely affected by
their removal.225 Ultimately, all that mattered was “that there are
countervailing explanations for the statutory distinction between ‘admitted’
and ‘adjustment,’ which are just as plausible, if not more so, than the
Government’s contention that such a reading would lead to an absurd
result.”226
The dissenters in both Bracamontes and Stanovsek argued that the BIA’s
interpretation, which treats all LPRs alike for purposes of section 212(h),
was a more rational reading of the statute.227 Ultimately, the majority
courts felt that, while a distinction based on manner of admission “appears
to make little sense” and may leave readers and judges alike asking why
“Congress [would] distinguish between those who obtained [LPR] status at
the time of lawful entry and those who adjusted status later, for purposes of
barring permanent residents who have committed aggravated felonies from
discretionary hardship relief,” the courts’ own inability to answer that
question did not warrant expanding the scope of the provision beyond the
clearly limited meaning expressed in the text.228

220. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 523 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
221. Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 544–45.
224. Id. at 545. In equal protection cases, for example, the legislature was permitted to
take reforms one step at a time; a statute need not fail for failing to address every problem at
once. Id.; see, e.g., Ry. Exp. Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (“It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at
all.”).
225. Martinez, 519 F.3d. at 545 (noting that this was exactly the situation for Martinez).
226. Id.
227. Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515, 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (Boggs, J., dissenting);
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 393 (4th Cir. 2012) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
228. Stanovsek, 768 F.3d at 520.
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3. Arguments for Deference to the BIA
Finally, the Government and the dissents placed greater emphasis on the
need to defer to the BIA, implicitly invoking the plenary power doctrine. In
his dissent in Stanovsek, Judge Boggs noted, “[J]udicial deference to the
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context.”229
Because the statute allowed for meanings other than that which the majority
adopted, courts should defer to the BIA on its interpretation of section
212(h).230 Similarly, Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit argued, in
Bracamontes, “When a statute yields two plausible constructions, we
should defer to the agency, especially when the statue pertains to
immigration matters.”231
D. Supreme Court Deference to the BIA:
Where Is the Court Headed?
While there is little scholarly discussion regarding the dispute over
section 212(h) in particular,232 theories about how the Supreme Court has
handled questions of deference to the BIA over statutory interpretation help
illuminate how it might address 212(h). As discussed in Part I, the Court
has historically been reticent to second-guess the BIA in matters involving
immigration policy and INA interpretation. However, recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence paints a surprisingly more complicated picture. This
section reviews decisions from the 2009 to 2013 Terms that addressed
whether to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of various INA provisions.233
1. 2009–2013: Opinions Withholding Deference
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,234 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve a circuit split over whether subsequent simple possession
offenses are aggravated felonies.235 ICE placed an LPR previously
convicted of two misdemeanor drug offenses in removal proceedings.236
229. Id. at 523–24 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 390 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
232. In the world of scholarship, discussion of conflicting interpretations of section
212(h) take place almost exclusively in practitioners’ guides or immigration news releases.
See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES
§ 10:21 (2015); BIA Reaffirms Matter of Koljenovic Outside of the 4th, 5th, and 11th
Circuits but Follows Contrary Circuit Precedents in Those Circuits, 89 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 926 (2012). One journal article describes the dispute over the meaning of
“admission” in section 212(h) alongside disputes about the meaning of “admission” in other
sections of the INA. See Griffith, supra note 33. Only one student note addresses the topic.
See Viridiana G. Carreon, Note, Section 212(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act After
Matter of Rodriguez, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 145 (2012).
233. This Note omits immigration cases on constitutional questions and federal
preemption.
234. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
235. Id. at 573.
236. Id. at 566.
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Although Carachuri-Rosendo had only received a ten-day sentence for his
second offense, an IJ found that he had been “convicted” of an “aggravated
felony” within the meaning of the INA because his conduct could have been
prosecuted as simple possession with a recidivist enhancement under state
law and could have been punishable as a felony under federal law.237 The
BIA affirmed, following circuit precedent,238 and the Fifth Circuit also
adopted the IJ’s “hypothetical approach.”239 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a second or subsequent simple possession offense does not
qualify as an aggravated felony when the state conviction was not based in
fact on a prior conviction.240 The Court found that the hypothetical
approach did not comport with a plain reading of the statute or the term
“conviction.”241
In Kucana v. Holder,242 the Court overruled the BIA on an issue that
went to the very heart of judicial review of BIA decisions: whether the
INA’s preclusion of judicial review of specific discretionary
determinations243 also extends to determinations made discretionary by
regulation.244 The BIA had denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen his
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit declined
removal proceedings.245
jurisdiction because a regulation prohibited review of denials of motions to
reopen, even though the INA did not.246 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the words “specified under this subchapter” precluded judicial
review only of determinations made discretionary by the statute.247 While
Congress had restricted judicial review in many provisions of IIRIRA, it
had not delegated authority to executive agencies to further restrict judicial
review by regulation.248 Therefore, the courts of appeals had jurisdiction to
review denials of motions to reopen by the BIA.249
In 2011, the Supreme Court overturned another BIA interpretation in
Judulang v. Holder.250 The Court reviewed the BIA’s “comparable

237. Id. at 570.
238. The BIA actually disagreed with the IJ’s reasoning and said that, in other circuits, it
would not treat a subsequent misdemeanor conviction as an aggravated felony unless the
conviction contained an express finding that the offender was a recidivist. In re CarachuriRosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 393 (B.I.A. 2007). It emphasized that it was interpreting a
criminal statute for which it was not entitled deference. Id. at 385.
239. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 572.
240. Id. at 582.
241. Id. at 576.
242. 558 U.S. 233 (2010).
243. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) precludes review of
denials of discretionary relief or any other decision, or action of the Attorney General, “the
authority for which is specified under [the] subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General” and enumerates specific administrative judgments that are insulated from judicial
review.
244. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 237.
245. Id. at 236–37.
246. Id. at 237.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 252.
249. Id. at 237.
250. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
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grounds” approach to applying 212(c)251 relief in deportation cases.252
Enacted prior to IIRIRA’s elimination of the distinction between exclusion
and deportation,253 212(c) only waived grounds for exclusion on its face.
To determine whether section 212(c) could relieve a particular deportation
ground, the BIA’s practice was to ask whether that ground consisted of a set
of crimes substantially equivalent to those included in the exclusion
grounds. If so, it could be waived under section 212(c); if not, the offense
was not waiveable.254
In a unanimous decision by Justice Kagan, the Court emphatically
overruled the comparable-grounds approach as arbitrary and capricious.255
In doing so, it stated, “When an administrative agency sets policy, it must
provide a reasoned explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it
is an unwavering one.”256 The Court conducted its analysis under the
Administrative Procedure Act257 (APA) rather than using Chevron because
it said that it was not dealing with an agency interpretation of statutory text,
but rather with an agency policy alleged to be unfair.258 It noted, however,
that its analysis would be similar under Chevron.259 The Court emphasized,
“The BIA’s approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration
system.”260 The policy here was “unmoored from the purposes and
concerns of the immigration laws.”261 The Court emphasized that the
agency must have an especially tight rationale when removal—a matter of
“utmost importance”262—was involved.
In two more cases, the Court declined to defer to the BIA’s
interpretations of the INA. In Vartelas v. Holder,263 the Court overturned
the BIA’s retroactive application of an IIRIRA amendment that affected the
ability of LPRs to travel without consequences after a conviction.264
Vartelas, a long-term LPR, had pled guilty to a felony in 1994; in 2003, he

251. Section 212(c) was repealed in 1996 and replaced by the cancellation of removal
provision, but it applies retroactively to those whose removal is based on a guilty plea
entered before the statute’s repeal. Id. at 481.
252. Id. at 483.
253. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
254. See Stein, supra note 91, at 47.
255. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479.
256. Id.
257. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that a reviewing court must set aside agency actions
that it finds to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law”).
258. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7. In contrast, the 212(h) controversy entails a
question of statutory interpretation that calls for a Chevron analysis—not a question of BIA
policy that would fall under the APA.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 485. To appropriately further the immigration scheme, a removal policy must
focus on a noncitizen’s fitness to remain in the country—the comparable-grounds approach
did not. Id.
261. Id. at 490.
262. Id.
263. 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012).
264. Id. at 1483–84.
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was placed in removal proceedings upon his return from a weeklong trip
abroad.265 The question at issue was whether the BIA was correct in
retroactively applying the 1996 amendment to Vartelas and other LPRs
whose convictions occurred prior to 1996.266 Writing for the majority,
Justice Ginsburg relied on the presumption against retroactive legislation
and overturned the BIA’s holding.267
In Moncrieffe v. Holder,268 the issue was whether a conviction under a
state criminal law constituted a “felony punishable under the Controlled
Substance Act” thus making it an aggravated felony.269 The Court
overruled the BIA’s interpretation, holding that a conviction under state law
criminalizing possession of small amounts of drugs did not constitute an
Like Carachuri-Rosendo,
aggravated felony requiring removal.270
Moncrieffe dealt largely with the interpretation of criminal statutes crossreferenced in the INA’s definition of “aggravated felony,” rather than with a
specific provision of the INA.
2. 2009–2013: Opinions Granting Deference
During the 2009 to 2013 Terms, the Court deferred to the BIA on issues
of statutory interpretation in at least three cases. In Kawashima v.
Holder,271 the Court agreed with the BIA’s interpretation and application of
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, which says that anyone who is
convicted of an offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the
victim exceeds a certain amount of money has committed an aggravated
felony.272 The Court found that the statutory text unambiguously made the
petitioners’ crimes—related to falsifying tax returns—aggravated felonies,
as they necessarily entailed deceit.273 While the Court acknowledged that it
had on some occasions construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in
noncitizens’ favor, it refused to apply the rule of lenity in this case because

265. Id. at 1483.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1484. The issue turned on the interpretative question of what conduct the INA
regulated. Justice Ginsburg understood the statute to regulate past misconduct. Id. Justice
Scalia viewed the regulated activity to be Vartelas’s readmission after travel outside the
country post-1996, not his pre-1996 commission of a crime. Id. at 1493 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). From that perspective, the application of the statute had no retroactive effect;
Vartelas could have avoided the consequences of the amendment simply by not traveling or
not returning from Greece. Id.
268. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
269. Id. at 1683.
270. Id. at 1682. The Court reemphasized the “categorical approach,” which determines
whether an offense is an aggravated felony based solely on the minimum conduct necessarily
established by a conviction under the applicable criminal statute. Id. at 1684.
271. 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012).
272. Id. at 1171–73.
273. Id. at 1173.
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“the application of the present statute [was] clear enough that resort to the
rule of lenity [was] not warranted.”274
In Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez,275 Justice Kagan wrote for a unanimous
Court, deferring to the BIA’s construction of section 240A.276 The
noncitizens in Martinez Gutierrez asked that their parents’ continuous
presence in LPR status be imputed to them to satisfy the statute’s
requirements for cancellation of removal.277 The BIA ruled that each
noncitizen seeking cancellation of removal must satisfy the statute’s
requirements on her own.278 The Supreme Court found that, because there
was no mention in the text of whether imputation should be allowed, the
statute was ambiguous.279 Under Chevron, it found the BIA’s interpretation
reasonable and deferred to the agency.280
Most recently, the Court deferred to the BIA’s statutory interpretation of
the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) in Scialabba v. Cuellar de
Osorio.281 The CSPA was enacted to remedy the problem of “aging out”—
when a child reached the age of twenty-one before her parent’s visa
application was processed, and thus no longer qualified as a derivative
“child” under INA section 101(b)(1), she fell to the back of the visa line or
lost eligibility completely.282 The CSPA provision at issue provided a
formula for calculating the “age” of an aged-out noncitizen to permit them
to still qualify for a visa. The question presented was whether that
provision granted a remedy to all noncitizens who had been derivatives on
family-based petitions but no longer qualified by the time a visa became
available.283 The BIA interpreted the CSPA as providing relief only to
those who could have qualified as principal beneficiaries of their own visa
petitions, as opposed to those who only initially qualified for a visa as
derivative beneficiaries.284
Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion determined that the statute at issue was
ambiguous and had more than one possible reasonable construction.285 The
Court consulted dictionaries, referred to congressional usage of the terms at
issue in other statutes, and compared other parts of the CSPA.286
274. Id. at 1176. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, dissented,
finding the statute ambiguous and interpreting it in favor of the noncitizens. Id. at 1176–81
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
275. 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
276. Id. at 2014–15.
277. Id. at 2017.
278. Id. at 2018.
279. Id. at 2016–18.
280. Id. at 2021.
281. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
282. Id. at 2196.
283. Id. at 2196–97.
284. Id. at 2197. The BIA found that the text at issue did not expressly state which
petitions qualified for automatic conversion and priority date retention. Given that alleged
ambiguity, it interpreted the statute to protect beneficiaries who could move seamlessly from
one family preference category to another and not those for whom a new sponsor was
necessary to move the beneficiary into another category. Id. at 2201–02.
285. Id. at 2203.
286. Id. at 2204–05.
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Ultimately, it decided the provision was internally contradictory, which
“ma[de] possible alternative reasonable constructions.”287 The ambiguity
in the statute permitted the BIA to distinguish among aged-out beneficiaries
in the manner it had chosen.288 Kagan concluded,
This is the kind of case Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might
have meant in enacting § 1153(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly.
Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex
statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction
consonant with its view of the purpose and policies underlying
immigration law. Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we
would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role.289

The concurring and dissenting opinions reflected great disagreement
among the Justices over statutory interpretation and agency deference.
Justice Roberts (joined by Justice Scalia) concurred in the judgment but
found ambiguity for different reasons.290 Justice Alito, dissenting,
acknowledged that the provision at issue was “brief and cryptic” and “may
well contain a great deal of ambiguity, which the [BIA] in its expertise is
free to resolve,” but felt the BIA ignored certain statutory commands in
resolving the issue.291
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, criticized the plurality’s application of
Chevron, saying that
unlike in the usual Chevron case, where ambiguity derives from the fact
that the text does not speak with sufficient specificity to the question at
issue, the plurality argues that this is a case in which ambiguity can only
arise—if it is to arise at all—if Congress has spoken clearly on the issue
in diametrically opposing ways.292

She argued that, when confronted with a statute that seems internally
contradictory, the Court should find ways to read it coherently rather than
assuming that Congress messed up.293 “As judicious as it can be to defer to
administrative agencies, our foremost duty is, and always has been, to give
effect to the law as drafted by Congress.”294 Sotomayor offered several
interpretations showing that Congress had spoken clearly to the issue of
conversion and thus ended the analysis at Chevron Step One.295
3. Theory About Deference in the Immigration Context
What do these recent cases mean for the Supreme Court’s current
approach to deference in the immigration context? In the late twentieth
century, some scholars suggested that the plenary power doctrine was dying
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 2203.
Id. at 2207.
Id. at 2213.
Id. at 2214 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2219 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id. at 2221.
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Kevin Johnson
out296 but made a brief comeback post-9/11.297
hypothesizes that recent Supreme Court immigration decisions suggest that
the plenary power doctrine is again headed toward its ultimate demise,
noting that during the 2009 to 2013 Terms, a “conservative Supreme Court
characterized by some observers as ideologically extreme, has consistently
followed generally applicable legal principles in its immigration
decisions.”298 Instead of applying extreme deference in the immigration
context, Johnson argues, the Roberts Court “consistently has applied
ordinary, standard, and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard,
and unremarkable ways.”299 This trend, he argues, may point to a
realigning of immigration law with “conventional norms of judicial
review.”300 In fact, Johnson says that “[i]t is difficult to discern
significantly different treatment of immigration matters by the Court and
any deviation from conventional legal doctrines” in the past few Terms.301
Rather, the Court has rejected the BIA’s interpretations when it concludes
that they are based on erroneous readings of the INA, and it is willing to
defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.302
Other scholars, like Shruti Rana, do not agree that the Supreme Court is
backing away from extreme deference in the immigration context.303 Rana
argues that recent jurisprudence in fact expands agency authority and gives
the judiciary a back seat in deciding immigration matters.304 Rana’s main
thesis is that, in the immigration context, the Supreme Court is transforming
Chevron’s division of interpretive decision-making authority (between the
federal courts and agencies) in ways that “may threaten to reshape
deference jurisprudence by handing more power to the immigration agency
just when the agency may be least able to handle that power effectively.”305
Rana believes increased deference to the BIA is especially disturbing
Due in part to being
given the current state of the agency.306
underresourced and overburdened, as well as to procedural changes
internally,307 many judges and scholars have noted a decline in the quality

296. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 60 n.9.
297. See id. at 60–61.
298. Id. at 62.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 65.
301. Id. at 113.
302. See id. at 114.
303. See Rana, supra note 87, at 345–46, 358.
304. Id. at 358.
305. Id. at 313.
306. See id. at 331. The deference doctrine assumes that agencies are specialists in their
respective fields and are more politically accountable than judges. Rana argues that the BIA
is currently “unable to meet even the basic requirements of legitimate decision making” and
cannot fulfill any of the responsibilities that deference doctrine assumes. Id. at 324–25. She
says, “Under almost any measure, indicators of quality decision making are lacking at the
immigration agency, and the agency appears unable to meet the minimum threshold
requirements for deference.” Id. at 331.
307. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
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of BIA review and have increasingly called for reform.308 Federal judges
across the country have acknowledged the inadequate performance of the
BIA.309 Critics say the agency is plagued with significant problems
including a backlog of cases, potential bias, widely inconsistent decision
making, and endemic mistakes.310 Rana criticizes the agency as one
“whose decision-making processes are rapidly decaying, one that is
increasingly unable to produce coherent decisions, much less high-quality
ones,” and one that should receive little deference from the courts for its
statutory construction.311 Instead, she laments, the Court has “increasingly
tilted the balance of power toward[] the agency by limiting judicial
interpretive authority in favor of agency deference.”312
The lively debate over the current state of judicial deference to the BIA
has played out in analyses of cases from the Court’s 2009–2013 Terms.
Kevin Johnson focuses on the Court’s use of traditional rules of statutory
interpretation in recent immigration cases as a signal of normalized review.
In Carachuri-Rosendo, he says, the Court followed a traditional approach to
statutory interpretation and administrative deference in analyzing the statute
at issue.313 It examined the ordinary meanings of statutory terms, consulted
dictionary definitions,314 invoked the immigration rule of lenity,315 and
found that the Government’s position ignored the plain language of the
Johnson thinks the use of traditional tools of statutory
INA.316
interpretation suggests the Court’s willingness to withhold deference from
the BIA when the plain meaning of the statute requires it.317 He points out
that the Court’s decision in Kucana supports a theory of normalization in
immigration jurisprudence because the Court chose to protect the right to
judicial review, in tension with the plenary power doctrine’s immunity from
judicial scrutiny.318
In contrast to Johnson’s depiction of normalized immigration
jurisprudence, Matthew Soares views Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima
as “highly illustrative of a dangerous trend in the field of immigration law,”
in which the Court has engaged in less judicial scrutiny and less lenity.319
Both cases involved the meaning of statutes used to remove long-term

308. See Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 26 (2012).
309. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.)
(citing the Seventh Circuit and other appellate judges); see also Rana, supra note 87, at 330.
310. Rana, supra note 87, at 319.
311. Id. at 318. Rana presents a scathing review of the BIA, calling it “an agency run
amok” and the “disaster agency of our time.” Id. at 333.
312. Id. at 318–19.
313. Johnson, supra note 95, at 74.
314. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 574 (2010).
315. Id. at 581.
316. Id. at 576.
317. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 114.
318. Id. at 77. He concedes that a contrary holding would have raised serious
constitutional questions. Id.
319. Soares, supra note 41, at 926 (calling these cases illustrative of a near total lack of
judicial review or oversight in immigration law).
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permanent residents that were open to multiple interpretations.320 The
result of the Court’s holdings in both cases was to restrict available relief
and to render more noncitizens removable.321 Johnson, on the other hand,
depicts the dispute between the majority and the dissent in Kawashima as
nothing more than differences of opinion over the proper way to interpret a
statute.322 He emphasizes the normality of Kawashima in administrative
law decisions323 and calls Martinez Gutierrez a “run-of-the-mill Chevron
deference case.”324
Judulang and Scialabba have perhaps invoked the most differing
opinions on the issue of judicial deference. The decision in Judulang
surprised those following the immigration field.325 The Court unanimously
overturned a nearly uniform bloc of circuit courts that all had sanctioned a
BIA policy, “striking down an executive agency’s rule in a domain in which
executive agency action has been viewed traditionally as deserving of
special deference.”326 Jeffrey Stein finds in Judulang a hopeful expression
of the idea that the Court is moving away from affording the BIA special
deference.327 The Court’s use of the APA (and, alternatively, Chevron) to
expose the BIA’s policy as arbitrary and capricious signaled that the Court
viewed its role in immigration as no different than from that in other areas
of ordinary jurisprudence.328 Judulang, he writes, shifted the immigration
system, “if subtly,” toward “a more reasoned jurisprudence,” opening the
door for future meaningful challenges to the BIA’s actions.329
In support of his view, Stein notes that the Court did not cite a single
plenary power case in its decision, but rather cited to quintessential and
universally applicable administrative law cases.330 The absence of any
discussion of plenary power, the executive’s role in immigration, or the
unique nature of immigration, Stein argues, serves as evidence of the
Court’s “current discomfort with—and, perhaps more precisely, disavowal
of—allocating more deference to the executive in immigration matters than
that branch receives in ordinary contexts.”331 Stein also argues that
Judulang introduced a “purpose inquiry” into the Court’s deference
analysis—by which the Court analyzes Congress’s objectives in passing the
statute at issue, as well as the purposes and principles of the immigration
system at large—thus deepening the substantive standard that immigration
agencies must meet.332 Ultimately, he argues, Judulang contributes to the
320. Id. at 944.
321. Id.
322. Johnson, supra note 95, at 94–95.
323. See id.
324. Id. at 98.
325. Stein, supra note 91, at 37 (noting “a flurry of commentary and confusion over
Judulang’s significance” in the aftermath of the opinion).
326. Id. at 35.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 35–36.
330. Id. at 56.
331. Id. at 56–57.
332. Id. at 38.
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“reigning-in” of traditional deference to executive immigration decisions.333
Johnson, who calls Judulang “a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and
the U.S. government’s defense of it,” seemingly agrees.334
Shruti Rana, on the other hand, reads Judulang much more cautiously.335
Although the Court overturned the BIA’s decision, she worries that, by
relying on the single-inquiry, arbitrary-and-capricious standard rather than
Chevron’s two steps, the Court limited its potential role in reviewing
agency decisions.336 She views Judulang as further collapsing the Chevron
test into one step: error checking, rather than first construing the statute
itself.337 Still, she acknowledges a small “glimmer of hope” that the Court
will be more open to addressing the agency’s endemic shortcomings if
presented with similarly poorly reasoned decisions.338
Lastly, despite its invocation of the plenary power doctrine, Kevin
Johnson found Scialabba to be “the most recent example” of a trend away
from special deference and toward an unexceptional analysis of
administrative action in immigration law.339 Johnson argues that Scialabba
was unexceptional in its application of routine administrative law
principles, with the Justices applying similar interpretative analyses but
reaching different conclusions.340 Other scholars, in contrast, have
criticized the Court’s deference to the BIA in Scialabba341 and questioned
its application of Chevron.342
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Part III conducts a statutory interpretation analysis and resolves the
arguments regarding LPR eligibility for section 212(h) presented in Part II.
It points to the complexity of the INA as a reason for why strict
interpretations at Chevron Step One make sense in the immigration context.
Additionally, it addresses whether the BIA’s construction would be
permissible if the text were actually ambiguous—making an argument for
invoking the immigration rule of lenity. Acknowledging that the distinction
between LPRs who entered as such and those who adjusted to that status
makes little practical sense, this part argues for construing the INA to afford
immigrants more opportunities for relief. Lastly, this part considers what

333. Id. at 52.
334. Johnson, supra note 95, at 93.
335. See Rana, supra note 87, at 353.
336. Id. at 353–54.
337. Id. at 353–55.
338. Id. at 355.
339. Johnson, supra note 95, at 108–09 (calling it an example of a “bread and butter”
immigration case).
340. Id. at 111.
341. See, e.g., Jihan M. Hassan et al., Finding Hope for “Aged Out” Derivative
Beneficiaries: Re-Examining the Child Status Protection Act in the Wake of Scialabba v.
Cuellar de Osorio, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1319, 1340–42 (2014).
342. See, e.g., Leading Case, Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 128 HARV. L. REV. 341
(2014).
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the current state of Supreme Court deference to the BIA means for section
212(h).
A. The Meaning of Section 212(h) Is Clear
The majority of the courts of appeals are correct: the plain meaning of
section 212(h) shows that the aggravated felony and continuous residence
bars apply to only LPRs who entered the country in that status. The
outcome of a challenge to the BIA’s interpretation of section 212(h) in the
Supreme Court would likely turn on whether the Court finds the provision
at issue to be ambiguous at Chevron Step One. The nine courts of appeals
that held, contrary to the BIA, that LPRs who adjusted status in the United
States could apply for a 212(h) waiver even if they failed to meet the
conditions specified did so after finding the statute unambiguous and clear
on its face.343 On the contrary, the BIA, the Eighth Circuit, and the
dissenting judges found the statute’s language to be ambiguous, moved to
Chevron Step Two, and found that deference to the agency’s construction
of section 212(h) was reasonable.344
Not only have the courts of appeals’s decisions followed this pattern, but
in its recent immigration cases involving statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court has also followed a similar path. The Court has ruled
against the BIA when it found a statute unambiguously clear, in spite of
agency arguments to the contrary that the statute was ambiguous.345 It
deferred to the BIA, on the other hand, when it found a statutory provision
ambiguous.346
In reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of section 212(h), a reviewing court
must first determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the question
of whether all LPRs fall under the eligibility bars.347 In writing section
212(h), Congress used two terms of art, each separately defined in the
definitions section of the INA: “admitted” and “lawfully admitted as a
permanent resident.”348 With the aid of these definitions, the statute is clear
on its face: no waiver shall be granted under section 212(h) to noncitizens
who have “previously been admitted to the United States” (meaning
inspected and admitted at the border) as noncitizens “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence” (meaning in the status of an LPR). The phrasing in
section 212(h) reads awkwardly because Congress intentionally combined
two statutorily defined phrases.
If Congress had meant for the bar to apply to all LPRs, it could have
made that clear simply by omitting the extra (and therefore unnecessary)
343. See supra Part II.B.
344. See supra Part II.C.
345. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
476 (2011); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S
233 (2010).
346. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014); Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2012).
347. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
348. See supra Part II.B.1.
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In fact, in section
phrase “has previously been admitted to.”349
212(h)(1)(B), which comes shortly before the phrase at issue, Congress did
use simpler phrasing to refer to U.S.-citizen or LPR relatives of the
potential waiver applicant: “the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence . . . .”350 That provision clearly refers to all LPR relatives
regardless of their manner of acquiring that status.
When one starts and ends with the text of section 212(h), the
interpretative exercise is fairly straightforward. When the text itself clearly
identifies Congress’s intent, there is no reason for an agency or judge to
depart from that text unless it is clear that Congress could not have meant
what it said, as demonstrated by absurd results.351 The BIA argued for
departure from the plain meaning because Congress could not have meant
to create such strange distinctions between LPRs.352 However, the BIA, the
Eighth Circuit, and the dissenting opinions all have failed to show
satisfactorily that anything truly absurd would result from applying the
statutory bar to LPRs who were admitted at the border in that status and not
barring LPRs who adjusted status inside the country. For something to be
absurd, it should be “so gross as to shock the general moral or common
sense.”353 The results suggested by the BIA, Eighth Circuit, and dissents
are admittedly strange, but while the disparate treatment of LPRs based on
technical procedural differences may seem to make little sense, such
treatment does not make the results shocking or absurd. There are reasons
that Congress may have made the choices it did.354 Furthermore, the BIA
and the government make technical distinctions among immigrants all the
time, such as through deferred action programs and policy memoranda
stating priorities for removal.355 By taking its current position, the BIA
threatens to blur the line between legislative and executive authority. When
Congress has spoken to an issue, it is not for the BIA (or any court) to
question its clearly manifested intent or to rewrite the statute to avoid
results with which it disagrees.356
The Eighth Circuit explicitly found the statutory phrase to be ambiguous
but did not offer a clear explanation for that ambiguity.357 The court’s
finding rested not on the wording of the provision in section 212(h), but
instead on an attempt to establish a coherent meaning of “admission”

349. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
350. INA § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
351. See supra Part I.B.1, I.C.2.
352. See supra notes 218–24 and accompanying text.
353. Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)).
354. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Memorandum on Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3C82-YD4N].
356. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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throughout the entire INA. The court argued that, when read with other
immigration provisions, section 212(h) might fairly be interpreted as
treating post-entry adjustment as a substitution for inspection at the port of
entry and therefore as an “admission.”358
While it is important to consider a provision in the context of the full
statute, the overall complexity of the INA and the fact that the same words
may have different meanings when used in different ways throughout the
statute cautions against trying to make the word “admission” read the same
way in every provision. The INA has been amended several times over
several decades.359 To suggest that the words “admission” and “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence” should mean exactly the same thing in
every context ignores the piecemeal way the INA has developed. If those
terms should be read consistently with any other provisions of the INA, it is
with the definition sections.360
In fact, in most of the INA sections to which the Eighth Circuit, the
dissenting opinions, and the BIA refer as examples of where an AOS was
an “admission,” Congress explicitly stated that a noncitizen’s AOS should
count as such only in very specific contexts. For example, INA section
245(a) says that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, adjust the
status of a person lawfully admitted to the United States to that of an
LPR361 and then record the date of AOS as the date of admission. The
Attorney General should then reduce the number of preference visas
available for the year accordingly.362 This procedure applies in only very
specific contexts and involves the Attorney General’s use of discretion to
depart from the normal manner of recording admissions and adjustments. It
should not, as the dissenting opinions suggest, be read as the general mode
of recording admissions and adjustments of status, but rather as an
exception.
In her concurrence in Negrete-Ramirez, Judge Berzon appreciated the
difficulty in deciding whether to force the word “admission” in section
212(h) to mirror other parts of the INA or to apply a plain reading of the
statute that reflects the section 101 definitions.363 She presented a
persuasive and concise explanation for why section 212(h) should be read
the way the majority courts have interpreted it. Judge Berzon admitted that
she was first inclined to defer to the BIA’s understanding of section 212(h),
thinking it to be informed by an acceptable interpretation of the INA as a

358. Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2014).
359. See supra notes 21–23; see also Rana, supra note 87, at 320.
360. The phrase at issue in this Note, which added the aggravated felony and continuous
residence bars, was added to the INA at the same time that IIRIRA also provided statutory
definitions for “admitted” and “admission.” Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 301(a), 348, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996). The concurrent amendment of both sections suggests that Congress was
especially cognizant of how it was using the word “admitted” in section 212(h).
361. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012).
362. Id.
363. See Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
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whole.364 Berzon ultimately concluded, however, that the court must apply
a plain meaning interpretation to the statutory definitions of “admission”
and “admitted” in the INA when it can sensibly do so. In this case, she
found that the juxtaposition of the statutorily defined term “admitted” with
a second statutorily defined term (“lawfully admitted for permanent
residence”) warranted a plain meaning approach:
[O]therwise, the term “admitted” would be redundant of the second
phrase. In some instances, however, such as where there has been no
admission of the sort contemplated by the statute, . . . [AOS] must be
treated as admission.
This nuanced approach now seems to me more faithful to the
appropriate division of responsibility between Congress and
administrative agencies, and between such agencies and the courts,
embodied in Chevron . . . than the BIA’s insistence on abandoning the
plain language throughout the INA with regard to the terms “admitted”
and “admission,” so as to avoid a context-specific approach in those
circumstances in which the statutory definition simply will not work.365

Berzon concluded that, while the BIA’s insistence on uniformity might be
the more orderly answer to the section 212(h) interpretive problem, it was
not the right one.366
If the Supreme Court takes on the 212(h) issue, it should follow Judge
Berzon and the majority courts to find the eligibility bar unambiguous: the
aggravated felony and continuous residence bars apply only to those LPRs
who gained their status through consular processing and were admitted at
the border as LPRs. Ultimately, the BIA, the Eighth Circuit, and the
dissenting writers did not provide satisfactory explanations for why the
statutory phrase was ambiguous or why the results of the majority’s reading
would be absurd. Instead, they simply disagreed with Congress’s decision
to bar only those LPRs who had entered the country in that status. Despite
the fact that the distinctions embodied in the statute may seem irrational and
strange, the Court should stay true to the plain meaning of the text and
invite Congress to amend the INA if it meant something different.
B. The BIA’s Interpretation Is Not Permissible:
A Call for Lenity
As argued above, the Court should find that the language of section
212(h) is not ambiguous. This section argues that, even if the Court did
decide the text was ambiguous, it should not accept the BIA’s interpretation

364. Id. The BIA’s premise was that the plain language approach to incorporating the
definitions of “admission” and “admitted” did not suffice in the context of section 212(h)
because elsewhere the INA provides for the assimilation of AOS to admission; failure to
read 212(h) as providing for a similar assimilation would lead to unintended and potentially
absurd results. Id.
365. Id. at 1055.
366. Id.

2015]

LPRs AND THE 212(H) WAIVER

1241

of section 212(h) because it is not a permissible construction of the
statute.367
As discussed in Part II, there are several arguments the Government and
the BIA put forth as to why their interpretation is reasonable. But reading
section 212(h) to deny all LPRs who have committed an aggravated felony
or do not meet the continuous residence requirement the chance to apply for
a waiver is not in fact permissible when one considers the purpose of
212(h).368
In considering the spirit of section 212(h) and what it is meant to
accomplish, it becomes clear that at least one of its goals is leniency toward
noncitizens that would otherwise be removable. Section 212(h) provides
discretionary waivers for certain grounds of inadmissibility to those who
meet certain conditions. It forgives the criminal transgressions of those
who are inadmissible solely for having committed a prostitution offense
more than fifteen years ago, those who have suffered domestic violence,
and those whose U.S.-citizen or LPR relatives would experience hardship if
they were deported.369 By its very nature, section 212(h) thus “contains a
purpose of leniency and forgiveness.”370
Furthermore, immigration laws in general have as at least a purpose the
goal of ensuring family unity.371 Congress recognized family unity as a
significant consideration in distributing 212(h) waivers, as seen in section
212(h)(B), which applies to those whose qualifying relatives would suffer
extreme hardship upon their deportation. By reading the provision in
section 212(h) to exclude all LPRs from applying for a waiver even when
their removal would cause extreme hardship to a qualifying spouse or child,
more noncitizens would potentially be split from their families, in conflict
with an overall goal of hardship waivers.372 The spirit of the statute thus
367. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
368. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011) (“[T]he BIA’s approach must be
tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of
the immigration system.”).
369. See supra Part II.C.
370. Soares, supra note 41, at 945. One counterargument to this reading of the purpose of
section 212(h) focuses on the House Report for the IIRIRA amendment that added the
provision to 212(h), which says: “This section amends INA section 212(h) to limit waivers
granted under that provision in the case of an immigrant previously admitted to the United
States.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 228 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). Some might
argue that this language supports a reading of section 212(h) that would bar more noncitizens
from applying for waivers. However, prior to 1996, the only immigrants categorically
barred from seeking a 212(h) waiver were those who had been convicted of murder or
criminal acts involving torture (or attempt or conspiracy to commit such crimes). See supra
note 74 and accompanying text. So, IIRIRA did limit the number of LPRs that would be
eligible for 212(h) waivers by adding the conditions related to aggravated felonies and
continuous presence. Reading section 212(h) to bar only LPRs who were admitted to the
country in that status and later committed aggravated felonies or failed to satisfy the
residence requirement therefore still drastically limits the waivers available.
371. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977). But see Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2019 (2012) (upholding the BIA’s decision even though it
conflicted with the goal of family unity).
372. See supra Part II.C.

1242

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

supports a narrow reading of the bar to eligibility—one that would allow at
least certain LPRs to apply—especially those who adjusted status here and
are more likely to have strong family ties to the United States.373
With its dual purposes of promoting family unity and forgiveness, section
212(h) provides the perfect context for applying the immigration rule of
lenity. Especially today, when grounds for removal have expanded just as
avenues for relief have shrunk,374 it is important for the Court to affirm the
majority courts. As amendments to the INA have made the removal
process increasingly mechanical and inhumane,375 a just application of
section 212(h) supports a more narrow reading of the 212(h) bars to
eligibility. The fact that the ability to apply for a 212(h) waiver can have an
enormous impact on an LPR’s life and family supports a more lenient
approach.376
C. Where Is the Court Going?
Given the Court’s inconsistent approach to deference to the BIA on
issues of statutory interpretation, it is hard to say whether the Court will
embrace this reading of section 212(h). Johnson believes that, by faithfully
following Chevron, the Court is moving away from historically
unquestioning deference to the BIA and instead mainstreaming immigration
analyses.377 While some of the outcomes of the cases from 2009 to 2013
suggest as much, it is also possible that most of the issues of statutory
interpretation that the Court considered in its past few terms were simply
not very difficult or controversial. In Martinez Gutierrez, the statute simply
did not contain an imputation component at all; pursuant to traditional
administrative law norms, the agency could fill the gap as long as it did so
reasonably.378 Johnson cites Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe as
symbolic of the Court’s sympathy for long-term LPRs and as a movement
away from deference to the BIA.379 But in Carachuri-Rosendo, the BIA in
fact agreed with the Court’s final outcome and only ruled differently
because it felt constrained by federal precedent.380 The Court’s opinion in
substance therefore did not actually depart from the stance the BIA said it
would have chosen in cases where it was not so constrained. Even in
overturning the BIA, the Court took pains to emphasize that its rejection of
the government’s broad understanding of the meaning of “aggravated
felony” would have a very limited impact on “policing our Nation’s
borders” and that the Attorney General still had discretion in issuing

373. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Part I.B–C.
375. See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 44, at 663–65.
376. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. The myriad moral, economic, and
social arguments for decreasing removals are unfortunately beyond the scope of this Note.
377. See supra Part II.D.3.
378. See supra notes 275–80 and accompanying text.
379. Johnson, supra note 95, at 101.
380. See supra note 238.
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relief.381 So, while Johnson is correct that the Court used unremarkable
tools of statutory interpretation, Carachuri-Rosendo is not a strong
indication that the Court is becoming more willing to overturn BIA
decisions. It was easy for the Court to overrule the BIA in that case,
especially because the BIA was interpreting a criminal statute for which the
BIA itself said it did not deserve deference.382 Similarly, in Moncrieffe, the
BIA’s holding turned on the interpretation of a criminal statute rather than
an interpretation of the INA.383 It was fairly uncontroversial for the Court
to overturn the BIA in both cases.384
Judulang presents a much stronger case for the argument that the Court
may be interested in holding the BIA to a higher standard. Although there
the Court chose to use the APA to strike down a BIA policy, its decision
also has implications for a Chevron analysis (indeed, Justice Kagan said the
analysis would be the same under Chevron as under the APA).385 Judulang
signaled that the Court might be more searching in reviewing agency
statutory construction in three ways: (1) it focused on examining the
underlying purpose of the laws at issue, (2) it made no reference to the
plenary power doctrine, and (3) the Court was deeply critical of the BIA.
Scialabba, however, frustrates each of those “glimmer[s] of hope.”386
First, in Judulang, the Court emphasized that, when reviewing an agency
interpretation of its statute, it is important to consider the purpose of the
laws at issue.387 If the Court considered the fact that section 212(h) is
meant to generally give relief, such an inquiry could support the majority
interpretation.388 However, it is not clear that Judulang has ushered in what
Stein saw as a new hopeful era.389 In Scialabba, the Court did conduct a
purpose inquiry, finding that the legislative purpose behind the family
preference system was “that each immigrant must have a qualified and
willing sponsor” and that the BIA’s interpretation of the specific statute fit
that purpose.390 In framing the statute’s purpose that way, the Court
ignored a competing legislative purpose: the reason behind having
derivative applications in the first place is to avoid separating families
despite the fact that not all family members always have a sponsor.391

381. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010).
382. See supra note 238.
383. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1678 (2013).
384. Carachuri-Rosendo was a unanimous decision (Justices Thomas and Scalia both
wrote separately, but concurred in the judgment); Moncrieffe was a 7-2 decision, with
Justices Thomas and Alito dissenting.
385. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
388. See supra Part III.B.
389. See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text.
390. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2014).
391. See, e.g., Asian Americans Advancing Justice on Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio:
Supreme Court Ruling Will Break Up Immigrant Families, ASIAN AMS. ADVANCING JUST.
L.A. (June 9, 2014), http://www.advancingjustice-la.org/media-and-publications/pressreleases/asian-americans-advancing-justice-scialabba-v-cuellar-de#.ViwyoVPF__8
[http://perma.cc/Z7AW-NQZA].
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Similarly, if the Court framed the purpose of section 212(h) as limiting
available waivers rather than providing relief, the purpose-driven inquiry
could actually hurt LPRs.392
Second, Judulang suggested indeed that the Court might be more willing
to reject a strong adherence to historical BIA deference as encompassed in
the plenary power doctrine.393 However, the Court made a complete
reversal in Scialabba, reverting back to using plenary power doctrine
language.394 Lastly, while Justice Kagan was extremely critical of the BIA
in Judulang,395 her tone changed significantly in Scialabba.396 Scialabba’s
reversion to plenary power and agency deference is troubling at a time
when its record in the past decade suggests the BIA is anything but
“responsible and expert.”397
CONCLUSION
The Justices’ discord in Scialabba and varying theories on the current
state of agency deference show that the verdict is still out on whether the
Court has closed the door on the plenary power doctrine. Still, it is true that
the Court has been using traditional tools of interpretation in its review of
BIA interpretation cases over the past few years. What does this all mean
for section 212(h)?
The dissent in Stanovsek cited Scialabba for the proposition that
deference is particularly important in the immigration context, which
suggests that the dissent saw hope in Scialabba for its position on section
212(h).398 However, if the Court applies traditional tools of statutory
interpretation as it has been and applies the definitions from INA sections
101(a)(13) and 101(a)(20) to the phrase at issue, it will likely conclude that
the meaning of section 212(h) is clear: only those LPRs who were admitted
at a port of entry in LPR status are subject to the bar in 212(h). While it
may be unsettling that Congress would distinguish between LPRs based on
the procedure by which they obtained that status, it is not for any court or
agency to abandon the plain meaning of the statute. Congress chose that
“tortured language” for a reason, and it is up to Congress to change the
statute if it feels so compelled.
In the meantime, in an era where immigrants are finding themselves
increasingly exposed to deportation with fewer avenues for relief, a more
392. See supra Part III.B.
393. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011) (“Agencies, the BIA among
them, have expertise and experience in administering their statutes that no court can properly
ignore. But courts retain a role, and an important one.”).
394. See supra note 289. Judge Niemeyer’s dissent from the majority’s 212(h)
interpretation also emphasized that Chevron deference should have special force in relation
to the INA because immigration law involves sensitive political and foreign policy
questions. Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 393 (4th Cir. 2012) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
395. See supra notes 255–62 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 289.
397. See supra notes 306–12 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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lenient reading of section 212(h) is all the more important. As the courts of
appeals determine this issue one by one, it remains to be seen whether the
Court will finally settle the question of which LPRs are barred from seeking
212(h) waivers.

